Oral Arguments Schedule

Case Details

Court

No. SCWC-19-0000697, Tuesday, November 29, 2022, 10 a.m.

STATE OF HAWAI`I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PAOLA IBARRA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant, and GUSTAVO FERREIRA, Respondent/Co-Defendant-Appellee.

The above-captioned case has been set for oral argument on the merits at:

Supreme Court Courtroom
Ali`iōlani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street
Honolulu, HI 96813

The oral argument will also be livestreamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

This oral argument can also be viewed on Olelo Channel 49 via your computer or a television.

Attorney for Petitione Paola Ibarra:

Myron H. Takemoto

Attorney for Respondent State of Hawaiʻi:

Brian R. Vincent, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTE: Order accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 09/28/22.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

Petitioner Paola Ibarra (“Ibarra”) appeals from the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (“ICA”) judgment affirming the Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s (“circuit court”) Judgment of Conviction. After a jury trial, Ibarra was convicted of promoting prostitution in violation of HRS § 712-1203.

Ibarra raises three issues. First, Ibarra asks whether the ICA erred in holding that Ibarra’s waiver of her right not to testify was knowing, intelligent and voluntary where the circuit court failed to engage Ibarra in an ultimate Tachibana colloquy prior to her testimony at trial. Ibarra contends that without the ultimate colloquy informing her of her right not to testify, there is no basis in the record to confirm that her decision to waive her right not to testify was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

Second, Ibarra raises a question of statutory interpretation. In order to be convicted of promoting prostitution in violation of HRS § 712-1203, a defendant must either “advance[] prostitution” as defined in HRS § 712-1201(1) or “profit[] from prostitution” as defined in HRS § 712-1201(2). Ibarra argues that the circuit court correctly found that no reasonable jury could find Ibarra guilty under the “advancement alternative.” Ibarra further argues that because testimony at trial makes clear that Ibarra only accepted money from the complaining witness in repayment of costs that Ibarra had fronted for the complaining witness, Ibarra could not have profited from prostitution within the intended meaning of HRS § 712-1201(2). Ibarra points to the legislative history of the statute, contending that the legislature intended to target only pimps and sex traffickers.

Third, Ibarra argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in cross-examining Ibarra.

No. SCWC-20-0000175, Tuesday, November 29, 2022, 2 p. m.

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent/Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. BRANDON FETU LAFOGA and RANIER INES, also known as Schizo, Petitioners/Defendants-Appellants.

The above-captioned case has been set for oral argument on the merits at:

Supreme Court Courtroom
Aliʻiōlani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street
Honolulu, HI 96813

The oral argument will also be livestreamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorney for petitioner Ranier Ines:

Kai Lawrence

Attorney for petitioner Brandon Fetu Lafoga:

William Li

Attorney for respondent State of Hawaiʻi:

Stephen K. Tsushima, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTE: Order accepting Ranier Ines’s Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 10/12/22.

NOTE: Order accepting Brandon Fetu Lafoga’s Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 10/12/22.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

Petitioners Brandon Fetu Lafoga (Lafoga) and Ranier Ines (Ines) appeal from the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming the Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s (circuit court) Judgment of Conviction and Amended Judgment.

Lafoga and Ines were tried by jury as co-defendants. After being found guilty of attempted murder among other charges, the circuit court sentenced Lafoga to an extended term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole with a mandatory minimum term of twenty years, another extended term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, and an extended term of an indeterminate twenty-year imprisonment. Ines was found guilty of accomplice to attempted murder among other charges, and he was sentenced to an extended term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Lafoga and Ines present two main arguments before the Supreme Court. First, they argue that the semi-anonymous jury procedure, where jurors were referred to by number instead of by name, undermined their presumption of innocence at trial and impacted their right to an impartial jury. Second, they assert that the extended sentencing jury instructions were misleading. The circuit court asked the jury to pick between a “possible” and a “definite” life term of imprisonment, which Lafoga and Ines claim did not capture the actual difference in the sentences they were facing: life with or without the possibility of parole. Based on these two issues, Lafoga and Ines ask for a new trial and/or resentencing.

The State contends that the jury process did not unfairly impact Lafoga and Ines’s trial, because the circuit court took steps to mitigate any prejudicial effect against the co-defendants. As for the jury instructions, the State maintains that they were standard extended sentencing instructions for attempted murder. The State asserts that the law prohibits jurors from being instructed on parole procedures when discussing extended sentencing, and so the instructions were sufficient. Thus, the State asks for their judgments and sentences to be upheld.

(Courts in the Community)

No. SCWC-17-0000181 Tuesday, December 6, 2022, 10 a.m.

HOʻOMOANA FOUNDATION, Respondent/Respondent/Appellant-Appellee, vs. LAND USE COMMISSION, STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent/Petitioner/Appellee-Appellant, and PUʻUNOA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; AND ROSS R. SCOTT, Petitioners/Respondents/Appellees-Appellees.

The above-captioned case has been set for oral argument on the merits at:

Lahainaluna High School
980 Lahainaluna Road
Lahainaluna, HI 96761

Attorneys for Petitioner Land Use Commission, State of Hawaiʻi:
Kimberly T. Guidry, Solicitor General, and Robert T. Nakatsuji, First Deputy Solicitor General

Attorneys for Petitioners Puʻunoa Homeowners Association, Inc. and Ross R. Scott:
Deborah K. Wright, Keith D. Kirschbraun, and Douglas R. Wright of Wright & Kirschbraun

Attorney for Respondent Hoʻomoana Foundation:
James W. Geiger of Mancini, Welch & Geiger LLP

NOTE: Order accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 09/16/22.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

In 2014, Hoʻomoana Foundation (“Hoʻomoana”) filed an application for a special use permit (“application”) with the Maui Planning Commission. The application was for a proposed overnight campsite facility in the agricultural district near Lahaina. While the application was pending, the Puʻunoa Homeowners Association and its president (“Puʻunoa”) filed a petition for declaratory order (“petition”) with the Hawaiʻi Land Use Commission (“the LUC”). Puʻunoa sought a declaration that Hoʻomoana’s campsite facility could not be authorized by special use permit and instead required a district boundary amendment.

The LUC granted the petition, declaring that the campsite could not be authorized by special use permit under Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes §§ 205-4.5 and 205-6. The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (“circuit court”) reversed, holding that the campsite could be authorized by special use permit in light of Mahaʻulepu v. Land Use Commission, 71 Haw. 332, 790 P.2d 906 (1990). The Intermediate Court of Appeals determined Mahaʻulepu was controlling and therefore affirmed the circuit court’s ruling as to the special permit issue. Puʻunoa and the LUC filed applications for writs of certiorari, arguing that: overnight camps on class A and B agricultural lands cannot be authorized by special permit; Mahaʻulepu should be overruled; and Hoʻomoana waived its argument regarding Mahaʻulepu.

(Amended 09/14/22)

No. SCAP-21-0000363, Tuesday, December 13, 2022, 10 a.m.

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, EX REL. HOLLY T. SHIKADA, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY; SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. LLC; SANOFI US SERVICES INC., formerly known as SANOFI-AVENTIS U.S. INC.; SANOFI-SYNTHELABO LLC, Defendants-Appellants; and SANOFI S.A., Defendant-Appellee.

The above-captioned case has been set for oral argument on the merits at:

Supreme Court Courtroom
Aliʻiōlani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street
Honolulu, HI 96813

The oral argument will also be livestreamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorneys for Appellants Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, Sanofi US Services Inc., and Sanofi-Synthelabo LLC:

Paul Alston and Claire Wong Black of Dentons US LLP

Attorneys for Appellee State of Hawaiʻi, ex rel. Holly T. Shikada, Attorney General:

L. Richard Fried, Jr. and Patrick F. McTernan of Cronin, Fried, Sekiya, Kekina & Fairbanks; Kimberly T. Guidry, Solicitor General, and Nicholas M. McLean, Deputy Solicitor General

NOTE: Order granting Application for Transfer, filed 05/03/22.

NOTE: Order granting motion to continue oral argument from 10/18/22 at 10:00 a.m. to 12/13/22 at 10:00 a.m., filed 9/14/22.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

In 2014, Plaintiff-Appellee the State of Hawai‘i sued Defendants-Appellants Bristol-Myers Squibb and Sanofi (both pharmaceutical companies) for violating Hawai‘i’s Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices law (UDAP). The State claimed that Plavix was less effective for patients with certain liver-enzyme genotypes (poor responders). It alleged that Defendants-Appellants had knowingly omitted information about Plavix’s diminished efficacy for poor responders from the Plavix label and failed to adequately research variability of response to Plavix. The State alleged these omissions violated the UDAP’s prohibition of unfair and deceptive acts and practices. The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted summary judgment for the State on one aspect of its deceptive-acts UDAP claim (materiality) and then, following a bench trial, held for the State on its UDAP claim. The court said Defendants’ acts were both deceptive and unfair under the UDAP and imposed a $834 million penalty.

Defendants-Appellants appealed to the ICA and the State petitioned for transfer to this court. We granted the State’s petition.

On appeal, Defendants-Appellants argue the Circuit Court erred in granting summary judgment for the State and concluding they violated the UDAP. They challenge the circuit court’s approach to promoting settlement and drafting its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. They also argue that the State’s suit is time-barred, preempted, and barred by the UDAP’s safe harbor provision. (UDAP’s safe harbor provision, HRS § 481A-5(a)(1), exempts “[c]onduct in compliance with the orders or rules of, or a statute administered by, a federal, state, or local governmental agency” from the statute’s ambit.) Finally, Defendants-Appellants challenge the penalty imposed on them as unlawful and unconstitutional. The State maintains that the circuit court did not err in granting it summary judgment on the issue of materiality or in concluding that Defendants violated the UDAP. The State also maintains that its suit is timely and neither preempted nor barred by the UDAP’s safe harbor provision, and that the penalty imposed by the circuit court is lawful and constitutional.

No. SCAP-22-0000045, Tuesday, December 13, 2022, 2 p. m.

State of Hawai’i, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. RAVEN MORTENSEN-YOUNG, LANCE M. OSHIMA, MARLIN TUCKER, and RYAN D. WOOD, Defendants-Appellees.

The above-captioned case has been set for oral argument on the merits at:

Supreme Court Courtroom
Aliʻiōlani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street
Honolulu, HI 96813

The oral argument will also be livestreamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorney for Appellant State of Hawaiʻi: 

Brian R. Vincent, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Attorney for Appellees Raven Mortensen-Young, Lance M. Oshima, Marlin Tucker, and Ryan D. Wood:

Alen M. Kaneshiro

NOTE: Order granting Application for Transfer, filed 05/06/22.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant the State of Hawaiʻi (the State) charged Respondents/Defendants-Appellees Raven S. Mortensen-Young, Marlin Tornquist Tucker, Ryan D. Wood, and Lance M. Oshima (collectively, Respondents) by complaint with the offense of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant in the District Court of the First Circuit (district court).

Respondents each filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Defective Complaint and Improper Arraignment” (Motions to Dismiss), arguing that the complaint was not supported by: (1) the complainant’s signature; or (2) a declaration submitted in lieu of affidavit, as required by this court’s decision in State v. Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi 262, 500 P.3d 447 (2021). The State opposed the Motions to Dismiss.

After holding a hearing, the district court granted the Motions to Dismiss Without Prejudice and issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

In this transfer case, the State contends that (1) “[t]he district court erred in concluding that the charging instruments in these cases were required to comply with HRS § 805-1 and thus erred in dismissing these charging instruments on the grounds that they did not comply with that statute;” and (2) “[a]ssuming arguendo that the charging instruments in these cases were required to comply with HRS § 805-1, the district court erred in concluding that HRS § 805-1, as interpreted by Thompson, requires a ‘declaration in lieu of affidavit containing the complainant’s signature.’”

No. CAAP-21-0000517 (Consolidated with CAAP-21-0000513), Wednesday, January 11, 2023, 10 a.m.

EDMOND KRAFCHOW, KATHLEEN KRAFCHOW, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. DONGBU INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., nka DB INSURANCE CO., LTD., JOHN MULLEN & CO., INC., Defendants-Appellants, and John Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-10, Doe Entities 1-10, Defendants.

The above-captioned case has been set for argument on the merits at:

Supreme Court Courtroom
Aliʻiolani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street
Honolulu, HI 96813

The oral argument will also be livestreamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Dongbu Insurance Company, nka DB Insurance Co., Ltd., and John Mullen & Co., Inc.:

Wesley H.H. Ching, and Nadine Y. Ando

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees Edmond Krafchow and Kathleen Krafchow:

Thomas C. Zizzi, and Peter N. Martin

NOTE: Order granting motion to continue oral argument from 11/9/22 to 12/7/22 at 10:00 a.m., filed 10/12/22.

NOTE: Order granting motion to continue oral argument from 12/7/22 to 1/11/23 at 10:00 a.m., filed 10/24/22.

COURT: Ginoza, C.J., Hiraoka, and Wadsworth, JJ.

Brief Description:

Plaintiffs-Appellees Edmund Krafchow and Kathleen Krafchow (collectively, the Krafchows) owned three structures damaged by a wildfire. They made first-party claims under three insurance policies issued by Defendant-Appellant Dongbu Insurance Co., Ltd. The Krafchows and Dongbu did not agree on the amount of loss. As provided by the insurance policies, each side chose an appraiser, and the circuit court chose an umpire. The appraisers were to separately set the amount of loss. If the appraisers did not agree, the umpire was to agree with one or the other to set the amount of loss.

Three awards were issued. Each was signed by the appraiser chosen by the Krafchows and by the umpire. Each established values for various categories of loss, reduced the amount by a deductible, and stated: “This award shall be payable within 20 calendar days.”

The Krafchows moved to confirm the awards under HRS § 658A-22. Dongbu moved to vacate the awards under HRS § 658A-22. The circuit court granted the Krafchows’ motion and denied Dongbu’s motion.

On appeal, Dongbu argues that the circuit court erred because the appraiser chosen by the Krafchows and the umpire exceeded their powers by determining whether the insurance policies covered certain claimed losses — an issue Dongbu contends is to be decided by the circuit court.

The Krafchows make two arguments. First, they contend that their appraiser and the umpire had the power to make coverage determinations. Second, they contend that any errors made by their arbitrator and the umpire were mistakes in their findings and in the application of law, which do not constitute grounds to vacate the awards.

No. SCWC-20-0000457, Thursday, January 12, 2023, 2 p.m.

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LOGOVII TALO, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

The above-captioned case has been set for oral argument on the merits at:

Supreme Court Courtroom
Aliʻiōlani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street
Honolulu, HI 96813

The oral argument will also be livestreamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorney for Petitioner Logovii Talo:

Jon N. Ikenaga, Deputy Public Defender

Attorney for Respondent State of Hawaiʻi:

Loren J. Thomas, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTE: Certification of Recusal, by Associate Justice Paula A. Nakayama, filed 08/29/22.

NOTE: Order assigning Circuit Judge Clarissa Y. Malinao, in place of Nakayama, J., recused, filed 09/16/22.

NOTE: Order accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 10/11/22.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ., and Circuit Judge Malinao, in place of Nakayama, J., recused.

Brief Description:

In 2016, the State charged Logovii Talo (“Talo”) with felony second-degree assault. After Talo pleaded no contest, he was sentenced to probation for four years with certain terms and conditions, including that: (1) Talo could not own or possess any firearms or ammunition; and (2) Talo could be subjected to a warrantless search of his person, residence, and vehicle based on reasonable suspicion that illicit substance(s) or contraband may be found (“Condition Q”). In 2019, the Adult Probation Division executed a warrantless search of Talo’s residence and found a firearm and ammunition.

During the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke Talo’s probation, Talo moved to suppress the evidence resulting from the warrantless search of his residence, arguing the search was unreasonable. The circuit court denied the motion and re-sentenced Talo to a five-year term of imprisonment. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) affirmed. On certiorari, Talo asks (1) whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the warrantless search of Talo’s residence was not unreasonable; and (2) whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Talo to a five-year term of imprisonment.

The court also ordered supplemental briefing regarding whether the imposition of Condition Q was consistent with Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 706-624(2) (2016) and this court’s holding in State v. Kahawai, 103 Hawaiʻi 462, 462-63, 83 P.3d 725, 725-26 (2004) (“We hold that a sentencing court may not impose discretionary conditions of probation pursuant to [HRS] § 706-624(2) (1993) unless there is a factual basis in the record indicating that such conditions ‘are reasonably related to the factors set forth in [HRS §] 706-606’ and insofar as such ‘conditions involve only deprivations of liberty or property[,]’ that they ‘are reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated in [HRS §] 706-606(2)[.]’ HRS § 706-624(2).”).

No. SCAP-22-0000029, Thursday, January 19, 2023, 10 a.m.

ACADEMIC LABOR UNITED, an unincorporated association; ASHLEY HIʻILANI SANCHEZ; KAWENAʻULAOKALĀ KAPAHUA; and CAMERON GRIMM, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAIʻI; HAWAIʻI LABOR RELATIONS BOARD; and STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Defendants-Appellees.

The above-captioned case has been set for oral argument on the merits at:

Supreme Court Courtroom
Aliʻiōlani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street
Honolulu, HI 96813

The oral argument will also be livestreamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorneys for appellants Academic Labor United, Ashley Hiʻilani Sanchez; Kawenaʻulaokalā Kapahu; and Cameron Grimm:

Lance D. Collins of the Law Office of Lance D. Collins, and Bianca K. Isaki of the Law Office of Bianca Isaki

Attorneys for appellee Hawaiʻi Labor Relations Board:

Linda K. Goto and Midori K. Hirai

Attorneys for appellee Board of Regents of the University of Hawaiʻi:

Carrie K. S. Okinaga, University General Counsel, and Joseph F. Kotowski, Associate General Counsel

Attorneys for appellee State of Hawaiʻi:

James E. Halvorson and Richard H. Thomason, Deputy Attorneys General

NOTE: Order granting Application for Transfer, filed 08/29/22.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

This case is brought by Academic Labor United (ALU), an unincorporated graduate students’ organization that seeks to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of graduate student employees of the University of Hawaiʻi (“Appellants”). Appellants sued the Board of Regents of the University of Hawaiʻi, the Hawaiʻi Labor Relations Board, and the State of Hawaiʻi (Appellees) in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, seeking eight declaratory judgments. These included a declaration that members of ALU are persons in public employment within the meaning of Article 8, Section 2 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution and H.R.S. § 89-2; a declaration that they have the right to organize for the purposes of collective bargaining; and a declaration that they have the right to be included within one or more of the bargaining units established by H.R.S. § 89-6.

Appellees moved to dismiss, arguing that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Adding new positions – such as graduate student employees – to existing collective bargaining units requires HLRB to hold an administrative hearing in which current bargaining units may participate. Because the judgment of the circuit court would not be binding on these existing bargaining units, they would be free to re-litigate the issue, and the circuit court’s judgment would not terminate the controversy. Appellees further argued that, under the doctrine of exhaustion, Appellants were required to seek relief from the HLRB before pursuing relief at the circuit court.

The circuit court agreed with both arguments and granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss. On appeal, Appellants contend that the circuit court erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. They request that this court consider the merits of the case and grant their requests for declaratory judgment.