Oral Arguments Schedule

(2nd Amended 5/11/21)

No. SCAP-20-0000110 Thursday, May 20, 2021, 2 p.m.

In RE INVESTIGATION OF KAHEA (Department of the Attorney General, State of Hawaii, AG Subpoena No. 2019-158).

The above-captioned case has been set for argument on the merits at:

The oral argument will be held remotely and will be live streamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorney for Appellant KAHEA:

Richard Naiwieha Wurdeman

Attorneys for Appellee Dept. of the Attorney General:

Lawrence L. Tong, David D. Day, and Lauren M. Nakamura, Deputy Attorneys General

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Anonymous Donors to Kahea:

Lance D. Collins of the Law Office of Lance D Collins, and Bianca Isaki of the Law Office of Bianca Isaki

NOTE: Order granting Application for Transfer, filed 03/10/21.

NOTE: Order granting in part and denying in part joint motion for leave to participate in oral argument; the Anonymous Donors to KAHEA will be allowed to participate in oral argument, filed 04/27/21.

NOTE: Amended Notice of Setting for Oral Argument due to rescheduling from 05/13/21 at 2:00 p.m. to 05/20/21 at 2:00 p.m, filed 05/11/21.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

The Department of the Attorney General, State of Hawaii, served a subpoena duces tecum on First Hawaiian Bank (the “Subpoena”) requiring the bank to produce certain banking and financial records related to the accounts of KAHEA: The Hawaiian Environmental Alliance (“KAHEA”). KAHEA moved to quash the Subpoena in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. The State Attorney General opposed KAHEA’s motion to quash; it argued that its subpoena requests were justified because of its ongoing investigations into whether KAHEA: (1) improperly solicited donations while noncompliant with a statutory reporting requirement; and (2) used charitable donations to advance illegal purposes. The Circuit Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part KAHEA’s motion to quash the Subpoena and entered judgment for the State Attorney General. KAHEA’s appeal of that order and judgment was transferred from the Intermediate Court of Appeals to this court.　　On appeal, KAHEA argues that the Circuit Court reversibly erred by denying in part KAHEA’s motion to quash. The Subpoena, KAHEA argues, is unreasonable and improper.　　Moreover, KAHEA claims the Subpoena was motivated by the State Attorney General’s desire to harass KAHEA because of its opposition to the development of an observatory on Mauna Kea. The Subpoena, KAHEA argues, is unconstitutional retaliation for KAHEA’s involvement in constitutionally protected activities.  The Department of the Attorney General opposes KAHEA’s appeal. It argues that the Subpoena is a lawful exercise of the State Attorney General’s authority to issue administrative subpoenas and that KAHEA has neither presented any evidence of the retaliatory motive it alleges nor stated a viable constitutional claim.

No. SCWC-17-0000727, Wednesday, June 2, 2021, 2 p.m.

STATE OF HAWAII, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RALPH CURTIS RIVEIRA, JR., also known as Ralph C. Riveira, Jr., Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

The above-captioned case has been set for argument on the merits at:

The oral argument will be held remotely and will be live streamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorney for Petitioner Riveira:

Harrison L. Kiehm

Attorney for Respondent State:

Stephen K. Tsushima, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTE: Order accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 04/07/21.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

This appeal arises from Petitioner/Defendant Ralph C. Riveira’s conviction for burglary in the first degree in violation of Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes § 708-810(1)(c). The ICA affirmed the conviction.

On certiorari, Riveira argues that his conviction should be vacated for the following reasons. First, he contends that the circuit court erred in admitting eyewitness idenitifcation testimony made during a field “show-up”. Second, Riveira challenges the admissibility of two photographs. Third, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the victims about the burglary’s impact on them. Fourth, Riveira contends that statements made by the State during its closing and rebuttal arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct. And fifth, Riveira asserts that the trial court erred in providing the jury an accomplice instruction.

No. SCWC-19-000563 Tuesday, June 22, 2021, 2 p.m.

STATE OF HAWAII, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. DANIEL IRVING JAMES MANION, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee.

The above-captioned case has been set for argument on the merits at:

The oral argument will be held remotely and will be live streamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorney for Petitioner Manion:

Alen M. Kaneshiro

Attorney for Respondent State:

Brian R. Vincent, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTE: Order accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/30/21.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

This case arises from a charge that the defendant, Daniel James Irving Manion (“Manion”), operated a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (“OVUII”) in violation of Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes § 291E-61. After suspecting Manion of OVUII, the officer asked Manion to participate in a standardized field sobriety test (“SFST”). Prior to the SFST, the officer asked a series of questions—known as the medical rule-out (“MRO”) questions—to determine whether Manion had a medical or physical condition that would affect his ability to perform the SFST. Manion responded “no” to each question. Officer Morgan also gave Manion instructions on how to perform the tests, asked him if he understood the instructions, and asked him if he had any questions before administering the SFST. After observing signs of impairment during the SFST, Officer Morgan offered Manion a preliminary alcohol screening. Throughout these events, Manion was never advised of his Miranda rights.

Manion filed a Motion to Suppress his statements. The circuit court suppressed Manion’s responses (1) to the MRO questions, (2) to questions asking Manion whether he understood the instructions for the SFST, (3) and to whether he had questions regarding the SFST because the questions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The circuit court also suppressed Manion’s performance on the SFST as fruit of the poisonous tree because the officer would not have administered the SFST without asking for and obtaining Manion’s agreement to participate in the SFST, asking for and obtaining Manion’s responses to the MRO questions, and asking for and obtaining Manion’s assurances that he understood the SFST instructions.

On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals concluded that questions asking Manion whether he was willing to participate in the SFST, whether he understood the instructions to the SFST, and whether he had any questions did not constitute interrogation, and that Manion’s performance on the SFST did not constitute incriminating statements requiring Miranda warnings.

This case requires this court to consider whether all evidence and statements obtained after an officer asks the MRO questions must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

No. SCWC-16-000167, Thursday, June 24, 2021, 2 p.m.

BERNET CARVALHO, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Royden Kalavi, Deceased, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. AIG HAWAII INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., HAWAII INSURANCE CONSULTANTS, LTD., Respondents/Defendants-Appellees.

The above-captioned case has been set for argument on the merits at:

The oral argument will be held remotely and will be livestreamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorneys for Petitioner Carvalho:

Arthur Y. Park, Patricia Kim Park, John C. McLaren, and Travis A. Yu of Park & Park

Attorney for Respondent AIG:

Steven L. Goto of Chong, Nishimoto, Sia, Nakamura & Goya, LLLP

NOTE: Order accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 04/05/21.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

This case arises from a dispute regarding payment of uninsured motorist (“UM”) and underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits to Bernet Carvalho (“Carvalho”), individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of her son.

Carvalho filed a Complaint against AIG seeking a declaratory judgment for increased and stacked UM and UIM insurance coverage totaling $1.2 million under the AIG policy covering her son. The parties submitted to arbitration and award was issued, but the case remained dormant for many years before trial was set. Prior to trial, AIG sought to preclude evidence that it breached its duty to settle the underlying UM and UIM claim prior to the arbitration award. The circuit court granted AIG’s motion. Carvalho filed a motion seeking to amend her Complaint, which the circuit court denied due to undue delay. The circuit court also denied Carvalho’s Motion for Reconsideration. AIG filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) which the circuit court granted.

The Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) vacated the circuit court’s Order Granting AIG’s MSJ, and remanded the case to the circuit court, but affirmed the circuit court’s Order Precluding Evidence, the Order Denying Motion to Amend Complaint, and the Order Denying Reconsideration.

Carvalho appeals the ICA’s decision to this court and raises the following points of error:

(1) Whether the ICA grievously erred in affirming use of an in limine motion to dispose of a substantive basis for recovery.

(2) Whether the ICA grievously erred in affirming under an abuse of discretion standard the Circuit Court’s determination that AIG’s delay in payment was not within the issues raised by the pleadings, where Petitioner had sought a declaration she was entitled to $1.2 million in benefits and AIG was on notice that it would need to defend its delay in payment.

(3) Whether the ICA grievously erred in holding that the Circuit Court had discretion to deny leave to amend even in the absence of a showing of bad faith or prejudice.

(Amended 05/11/21)

No. SCWC-18-0000755, Thursday, July 1, 2021, 2 p.m.

STATE OF HAWAI I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARTEMIO Y. AGDINAOAY, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

The above-captioned case has been set for argument on the merits at:

The oral argument will be held remotely and will be live streamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorney for Petitioner Agdinaoay:

William H. Jameson, Deputy Public Defender

Attorney for Respondent State:

Donn Fudo, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTE: Order accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/31/21.

NOTE: Amended Notice of Setting for Oral Argument due to rescheduling from 05/20/21 at 2:00 p.m. to 07/01/21 at 2:00 p.m., filed 05/11/21.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

This appeal arises from Petitioner/Defendant Artemio Yablag Agdinaoay’s conviction for Violation of a Temporary Restraining Order in violation of Hawai i Revised Statutes (HRS) §　586-4. In addition to sentencing Agdinaoay to 181 days of imprisonment with credit for time served, the Family Court of the First Circuit also ordered that Agdinaoay undergo domestic violence intervention (DVI). Agdinaoay filed a motion for reconsideration, challenging the requirement of DVI. The family court granted in part and denied in part his motion, concluding that DVI was mandatory under HRS §　586-4 but providing Agdinaoay with more time to complete DVI after he served his term of imprisonment. Agdinaoay appealed, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the sentence.

On certiorari, Agdinaoay argues that DVI can only be imposed as a condition of probation, and that probation was not available as a sentence since his term of incarceration exceeded six months, the maximum permitted as a condition of probation. Accordingly, he contends that the ICA erred in concluding that the family court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced him to undergo DVI in addition to his 181-day term of imprisonment.

No. SCWC-20-0000075, Friday, July 2, 2021, 10 a.m.

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSHUA YAMASHITA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

The above-captioned case has been set for argument on the merits at:

The oral argument will be held remotely and will be live streamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at YouTube.com/hawaiicourts.

Attorney for Petitioner Yamashita:

Benjamin E. Lowenthal, Deputy Public Defender

Attorney for Respondent State:

Richard B. Rost, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTE: Order accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 04/08/21.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Brief Description:

Defendant-Appellant/Petitioner Joshua Yamashita was convicted of various theft and property damage-related crimes. In addition to an open term of imprisonment, the circuit court ordered Yamashita to pay a Crime Victims Compensation (“CVC”) fee pursuant to HRS §§ 706-605(6) and 351-62.6, and a Drug Demand Reduction (“DDR”) assessment pursuant to HRS § 706-650.

On certiorari, Yamashita argues that the circuit court and the ICA erred in finding that he would be able to pay the CVC fee given his financial circumstances, health, age, and employment prospects. He also contends that the CVC fee and DDR assessment amount to unconstitutional taxes under the test established by this court in State v. Medeiros, 89 Hawaiʻi 361, 973 P.2d 736 (1999), and that the circuit court and ICA erred in (1) declining to apply the Medeiros test and (2) upholding the constitutionality of the CVC fee and DDR assessment.