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Oral Argument Before the Hawaii Supreme Court

No. SCWC-11-0000667 Thursday, November 21, 2013, 10 a.m.

STATE OF HAWAI`I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN WALTON, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

The above-captioned case has been set for argument on the merits at:

Supreme Court Courtroom
Ali`iolani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street 
Honolulu, HI 96813

Attorney for Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant:

Richard S. Kawana

Attorney for Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee:

Stephen K. Tsushima, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

NOTE: Order accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 10/04/13.


[ Listen to the entire audio recording in mp3 format ]

Brief Description:

Petitioner/defendant-appellant John Walton timely filed an application for a writ of certiorari to review the June 21, 2013 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals’s (ICA), entered pursuant to its May 21, 2013 memorandum opinion. The ICA’s judgment affirmed the Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s (circuit court) Judgment of Conviction and Sentence, which convicted Walton of attempted murder in the second degree in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 and 707-701.5 (1993).

 Walton and Courage Lee Elkshoulder were jointly tried by a jury for the stabbing of a taxi driver in Manoa Valley. A jury found Walton guilty of attempted murder in the second degree, and Elkshoulder guilty of assault in the first degree. The ICA affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.

Walton raises the six questions in his application. Specifically, Walton asks whether the circuit court erred in: (1) denying Walton’s motions for severance; (2) denying Walton’s motion to suppress evidence and identification testimony; (3) admitting a recorded telephone conversation between Walton and Elkshoulder, during which Walton allegedly made self-incriminating statements; (4) limiting Walton’s cross-examination of Elkshoulder; (5) instructing the jury with regard to distinguishing between liability as a principal and liability as an accomplice; and (6) denying Walton’s motion for judgment of acquittal.