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Oral Argument Before the Hawaii Supreme Court — SCAP-22-0000045

No. SCAP-22-0000045, Tuesday, December 13, 2022, 2 p. m.

State of Hawai’i, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. RAVEN MORTENSEN-YOUNG, LANCE M. OSHIMA, MARLIN TUCKER, and RYAN D. WOOD, Defendants-Appellees.

The above-captioned case was set for oral argument on the merits at:

Supreme Court Courtroom
Aliʻiōlani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street
Honolulu, HI 96813

The oral argument will also be livestreamed for public viewing via the Judiciary’s YouTube channel at

It can also be viewed on Olelo Community Television (Oahu) via your computer or a television.

Attorney for Appellant State of Hawaiʻi: 

Brian R. Vincent, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Attorney for Appellees Raven Mortensen-Young, Lance M. Oshima, Marlin Tucker, and Ryan D. Wood:

Alen M. Kaneshiro

NOTE: Order granting Application for Transfer, filed 05/06/22.

COURT: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ.

Listen to the entire audio recording in mp3 format ]

Brief Description:

Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant the State of Hawaiʻi (the State) charged Respondents/Defendants-Appellees Raven S. Mortensen-Young, Marlin Tornquist Tucker, Ryan D. Wood, and Lance M. Oshima (collectively, Respondents) by complaint with the offense of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant in the District Court of the First Circuit (district court).

Respondents each filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Defective Complaint and Improper Arraignment” (Motions to Dismiss), arguing that the complaint was not supported by: (1) the complainant’s signature; or (2) a declaration submitted in lieu of affidavit, as required by this court’s decision in State v. Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi 262, 500 P.3d 447 (2021). The State opposed the Motions to Dismiss.

After holding a hearing, the district court granted the Motions to Dismiss Without Prejudice and issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

In this transfer case, the State contends that (1) “[t]he district court erred in concluding that the charging instruments in these cases were required to comply with HRS § 805-1 and thus erred in dismissing these charging instruments on the grounds that they did not comply with that statute;” and (2) “[a]ssuming arguendo that the charging instruments in these cases were required to comply with HRS § 805-1, the district court erred in concluding that HRS § 805-1, as interpreted by Thompson, requires a ‘declaration in lieu of affidavit containing the complainant’s signature.’”