No. SCWC-12-0000578 Oral Argument Before the Hawaii Supreme Court
No. SCWC-12-0000578, Thursday, June 16, 2016, 8:45 a.m.
STATE OF HAWAI`I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. MANAIAKALANI N.K. KALUA, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee.
The above-captioned case was set for argument on the merits at:
Supreme Court Courtroom
Ali`iolani Hale, 2nd Floor
417 South King Street
Honolulu, HI 96813
Attorney for Petitioner:
Jon N. Ikenaga, Deputy Public Defender
Attorneys for Respondent:
Dale Y. Ross, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
NOTE: Order accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 02/24/16.
COURT: MER, C.J.; PAN, SSM, RWP, and MDW, JJ.
[ Listen to the entire audio recording in mp3 format ]
Defendant-Appellee Manaiakalani N.K. Kalua (Kalua) filed an application for writ of certiorari to review the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (ICA) November 10, 2015 Judgment, entered pursuant to its September 2, 2015 published opinion, vacating the amended order of the District Court of the Third Circuit (district court) granting Kalua’s motion to dismiss.
Kalua was cited for speeding and for excessive speeding, a petty misdemeanor. Kalua subsequently paid the fine for the speeding infraction. As to the excessive speeding charge, Kalua filed a motion to dismiss the charge pursuant to HRS § 701-109(2), which provides in part that a defendant “shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode.” The district court granted Kalua’s motion to dismiss.
The ICA’s Judgment vacated the district court’s order. The ICA held that adjudication of Kalua’s speeding infraction does not bar the State from prosecuting Kalua for the crime of excessive speeding pursuant to HRS § 291D-3(d), which provides that HRS § 701-109 shall not “preclude prosecution for a related criminal offense where a traffic infraction committed in the same course of conduct has been adjudicated pursuant to this chapter.” The ICA also held that double jeopardy does not bar the State from prosecuting the excessive speeding charge because the adjudication of Kalua’s speeding infraction was not a criminal prosecution, and thus does not trigger double jeopardy protections.
Kalua raises the following issue on appeal: “Whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the entry of judgment on Kalua’s non-criminal speeding infraction did not bar the State from prosecuting him for the crime of excessive speeding?”